Ruthenium 106 has been detected by several European networks involved in the monitoring of atmospheric radioactive contamination, at levels of a few milliBecquerels per cubic meter of air. 

IRSN has therefore undertaken investigations since October 3, 2017 to carry out an in-depth assessment of the measurements of ruthenium levels in the territory and to identify the possible origins of the situation encountered.

Ruthenium 106 has been detected by several European networks involved in the monitoring of atmospheric radioactive contamination, at levels of a few milliBecquerels per cubic meter of air.

So far, IRSN calculations, based on the concentration levels measured in several European countries and on the meteorological conditions of the last few days, seem to indicate that the contamination air could have been generated from southern regions of Ural or located close to those. IRSN is continuing its investigations to try to confirm the origin of this atmospheric pollution.

Ruthenium 106 has been detected by several European networks involved in the monitoring of atmospheric radioactive contamination. The very low levels observed to date have no environmental or health consequences.

​Precise measurement of internal contamination from a wound is a major challenge for the nuclear sector when it comes to radiation protection. IRSN has launched an international exercise to improve the procedures used to perform these measurements.

​The cooperation agreement will strengthen the cooperation in understanding and computer simulations of processes during severe accidents with melting of the reactor core and understanding potential environmental hazards that may pose potential risk to nuclear facilities and, of course, planning effective defense against them.

​The guidelines presented at the final meeting of the European Shamisen project underlines the importance of involving population in the management of an accident and taking into account the economic and social upheavals and the psychological effects, particularly in the context of an emergency evacuation.

​The National Institute for Quantum and Radiological Sciences and Technology (QST) carries out research on the cancerous effects of ionizing radiation which are complementary to those carried out by IRN on non-cancerous effects.

From their joint analysis of the files submitted by Areva NP, IRSN and the Nuclear Pressure Equipment Department (DEP) of ASN conclude that if the serviceability of the closure head and lower head of the Flamanville 3 reactor pressure vessel is demonstrated, in-service inspections must be implemented. At this stage, the feasibility of these inspections appears to have been acquired for the lower head. The same is not true for the closure head.