WP_IMPRIMER_TITLE

Following an international summit on nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism held on 12 and 13 April 2010 in Washington (USA), this paper sets out some points for understanding the means used at national and international level to ensure the inspection and protection of nuclear materials.

1- Some definitions

Nuclear security is the whole range of measures intended for the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.

The definition of nuclear non-proliferation, if we stick what is given in the dictionary, seems a little simplistic. It basically defines this as “limiting the amount of nuclear weapons around the globe”. Other dictionaries elaborate on this by defining non-proliferation as: “a policy to prohibit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries which do not possess them”.

For the sake of completeness, these definitions could be clarified by stating that international non-proliferation regimes are all the international instruments and policies that contribute to the prevention of access by states to weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) and their delivery systems (missiles), in violation of their international commitments. These international regimes may be accompanied by commitments and measures for disarmament.

"Nuclear" materials are materials that could be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive device, which are subject to specific regulations in the fight against nuclear proliferation. Three materials are covered by the international regulations: plutonium, uranium and thorium.

2- Milestones in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

The fundamental basis of non-proliferation was the coming into force of the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 5 March 1970. The main objective of this treaty was "to prevent nuclear energy being diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices." This treaty recognizes the special status of states possessing nuclear weapons. France signed up to the NPT on 8 March 1992.

Verifying that states party to the NPT fulfil their obligations is entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under the "safeguards agreements", the model for which is based on information circular 153 of the IAEA established in 1971 (Infcirc 153). These agreements are intended to ensure verification by the IAEA that the nuclear materials declared by states and placed under the system of IAEA safeguards are not diverted towards nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

In Europe, in 1957, the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) provided in Chapter 7 for the establishment of a security check, designed to verify compliance by users with their declared use: "to ensure… that the ores, raw materials and special fissile materials are not diverted from the uses to which their users have reported them to be intended." The provisions of these safeguards (declarations) were formalized in a EURATOM regulation in 1976, which was amended in 2005.

The similarity between the safeguarding role of EURATOM and the IAEA safeguards led these organizations to coordinate their activities in states covered by the EURATOM Treaty.

The Euratom Technical Committee is responsible for implementation of inspections of nuclear material held in France by the European Commission and coordinates the implementation of the France-Euratom-IAEA accords (ensuring the consistency of the French position, negotiating the terms of inspection, analysing the impact on strategic defence interests and so on). It relies on the IRSN for the management of declarations that must be made to the regulatory bodies for the support of international inspections (IAEA or EURATOM) and the collection of technical advice to define the French position.

In 1980 France passed a law regarding the protection and inspection of nuclear materials located anywhere in the country. The Ministry of Energy (HFDS: Senior Defence and Security Official) is responsible for monitoring the proper implementation of this in civil nuclear facilities. It relies on the IRSN to assess the measures for the monitoring, accounting and protection of nuclear materials proposed by the operators. The IRSN carries out, at the request of the HFDS, inspections at facilities and during transport to verify compliance with the measures implemented by the legislation.

Additional protocol to the safeguards agreements

In the late 20th century, four particularly worrying events have led the international community to seek to strengthen mechanisms preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and chemical.

1. In 1991, the Gulf War and the defeat of Iraq led to the discovery in that country of the existence of a secret programme to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

2. In the same year, the break-up of the Soviet Union was accompanied by increased risks of diversion and smuggling of nuclear materials from countries in Central Europe and the CIS, particularly because of the economic chaos in these countries.

3. In 1992, following the signing by North Korea of a "safeguards agreement" with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), abnormalities were found in a pilot plant for reprocessing nuclear fuel, leading the IAEA to suggest that nuclear material had been withheld from its inspection. In addition, satellite images had shown the existence of nuclear facilities to which international inspectors were denied access by North Korea. These elements, which led to severe diplomatic tension, represented a clear indication that North Korea was not meeting its commitments under its accession in 1985 to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

4. In 1998, two non-signatories of the NPT, India and Pakistan, carried out military tests of nuclear explosive devices.

In the nuclear field, these events led a group of international experts [1] to recommend that the IAEA be given new powers to detect clandestine activities. In 1993, the Agency launched a programme for "strengthening the safeguards ("93 +2"), which led to the establishment in 1997 of an "additional protocol" to the safeguards agreements (Circular INFCIRC/540), specifically to enable the detection of such illegal facilities.

Among the new measures, the IAEA required that:
• States provide information on all their nuclear activities (including those that do not involve nuclear materials)
• IAEA inspectors have greater access to facilities, including those which do not possess nuclear materials
• IAEA teams are allowed to take environmental samples in order to detect any possible traces of undeclared activities.

The Additional Protocol was ratified by France on 30 April 30 2004. In order to enable France to meet these obligations, the IRSN has been commissioned by the Euratom Technical Committee to implement the system for development of French declarations (information from operators, development of forms and manuals specifically for declaration purposes, development of data processing tools) and to collect the audits carried out by the IAEA ("complementary access"). This system has been in operation since 2004 and has enabled France to forward all such reports to the IAEA in accordance with the required deadlines. The IRSN actively participated in drafting the bill to implement the Additional Protocol.

Meanwhile, to help the former Soviet Union and central Europe to control the risks of theft, trafficking and diversion of nuclear materials on their territories, the European Union, the United States and the IAEA have acted in collaboration with the countries concerned and provided assistance in the form of direct financing and help with training.

Note:
1-  “Standing advisory group on safeguards implementation” (SAGSI): a group of 15 international experts, which meets 3 to 4 times per year to advise the Director General of IAEA on developments in the safeguards system.

Nuclear materials are materials that could be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. Their definition is based on their fissile (for a fission device), fusible (for a thermonuclear bomb) or fertile (ability to produce fissile or fusible materials) characteristics. Accordingly, these materials are subject to extremely rigorous checks at both international level (for fissile or fertile materials) and national level.

The risks of proliferation are picked up firstly at the state level, but secondly at international level. In the case of nuclear power, the IAEA is responsible for verifying that countries that have pledged not to develop nuclear weapons are honouring their commitments.

For states with nuclear weapons, the audits focus on the civil nuclear industry, which is subject to the same constraints as for other countries. This is the case for France, which submits its nuclear material to IAEA and EURATOM inspections.

At international level

International inspections are intended to detect any possible violation of commitments made by a state to only use nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Signing up to a treaty or convention on non-proliferation, and to its corresponding system of verification, is always a voluntary act undertaken by a sovereign state. The underlying motivation behind becoming a signatory may lie in a desire for greater international security or in order to take advantage of international measures for assistance and technical cooperation provided to states ratifying such treaties. It may also be the result of pressure such as trade or diplomatic sanctions taken against those states that refuse to sign such treaties.

At an international level, inspections are carried out by the IAEA and EURATOM. These inspections involve both the declaration and monitoring of the movement of nuclear materials (plutonium, uranium and thorium) between countries and declarations regarding the flow and socks of materials held at a national level which do not relate to materials concerned with national security. International inspections also involve inspections of French facilities by EURATOM inspectors and to a lesser extent by the IAEA.

At national level

At a national level, protection and inspection of nuclear materials is subject to specific regulations which fall under the Code of Defence and associated regulatory documentation. Given the importance of its nuclear industry and aware of its responsibilities regarding non-proliferation, France has adopted some of the most comprehensive regulations and organization in the world, covering both civil nuclear materials as well as those relevant for national security.

There are six materials covered by French legislation: plutonium, uranium, thorium, tritium, deuterium and lithium 6 (deuterium and lithium 6 are not radioactive). Their definition is subject to periodic reviews based on the advancement of knowledge and techniques.

Classification of nuclear materials for national inspection purposes

This regulation aims to prevent the loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials and to protect these materials and related facilities or transport against malicious activities.

In this context, the regulations require operators and industrial facilities holding these materials to comply with a number of provisions that complement each other, such as:

- physical protection measures to protect the materials against malicious action or sabotage by placing barriers and other devices between publicly accessible areas and the premises holding the materials
- monitoring of the materials such that the location and use of the materials is known at all times
- accounting measures such that the exact quantity of the materials is known at all times [2]. Each operator must keep their own accounts, which is regularly compared to centralized accounts held by the IRSN. For plutonium, such accounts shall be kept to the nearest gram
- containment measures to prevent unauthorised movement of materials
- surveillance measures which aim to ensure the integrity of containment and to verify that no material has been released illegally.

Possession of plutonium by an operator requires prior authorisation by the relevant authorities, which in France is the Senior Defence and Security Official (HFDS) of the Ministry for Energy. This authorisation is issued only after analysis of a file provided by the operator detailing physical protection, monitoring, accounting... This analysis is performed by the IRSN, which is authorised to act on behalf of the ministry.

The granting of authorisation for the most sensitive nuclear materials, such as plutonium, requires the operator to undertake a safety study in order to assess the effectiveness and relevance of the protection against key threats defined by the government. These threats include both an internal threat to the facility (from a malicious member of staff) and the threat of a group of heavily armed assailants seeking to enter the facility. The threats are reviewed periodically by specialised state agencies to reflect the changing national and international situation.

The regulations also require operators to conduct periodic inventories of all the materials they hold in order to detect possible discrepancies between the physical reality on the ground and the inventories of stock held. The authorities can then require the operator to produce a crisis inventory to confirm or deny information or any suspicion of theft of material. For this purpose, exercises to produce crisis inventories are regularly conducted by the operators concerned, the IRSN and the competent authorities.


Technical methods of inspection

- Inspection measures : Most inspections concern organizational, administrative or regulatory aspects. The physical follow-up of nuclear materials is checked by means of ‘reinforced’ inspections including physical measurements. These inspections may concern any phase within the fuel cycle. Inspectors take measurements (of the volume and quality of materials) to produce results that can be compared with those obtained by operators, thereby checking the quality of facility measuring systems and the accuracy of results used for monitoring purposes. Inspectors must ensure that their measurement results are relevant in order to be credible with regards to authorities and operators.

The measurement methods used by inspectors are based on conventional non-destructive measurement methods (gamma spectrometry, neutron measurement) adapted to the specific constraints imposed by the inspection context. First of all, the measuring devices used must be transportable. If the premises where the measurements are made are not adequate or barely so, this may affect the quality of results: the measurement area is often the storage area itself, or a nearby room.

- "Containment monitoring" of nuclear materials : "Containment" refers to all measures taken to prevent unauthorised or unjustified movement of nuclear materials, and "monitoring" to all those actions that ensure complete containment, confirm no abnormal release, no falsification and correct operation of the equipment used.

Initially, inspection bodies analyse records of operators describing the systems in place in their facilities. The devices most commonly used include video cameras, nuclear sensors (gamma or neutron), seals, movement sensors (radar, infrared sensor) and also door opening detectors. They then check during inspections, that the expected materials have been properly positioned, are working correctly and have not been fraudulently used.

Note:
2– More information on the protection and inspection of nuclear materials in France : see our specific documentation.